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In 2014, Pacific Island countries mobi-
lized to carry a regional voice into 
global summits on climate change, 
Small Island Developing States (sids), 
and Sustainable Development Goals. 
It was a year of elections across the 
region, fought largely on national 
issues but with outcomes that have 
significant regional implications.
There was ongoing debate about 
Pacific regionalism and the health of 
regional institutions. The leadership 
of the Pacific Islands Forum Secre-
tariat (pifs) was transferred from 
out going Secretary-General Tuiloma 
Neroni Slade to Papua New Guinea’s 
Dame Meg Taylor, with the Forum 
adopting a new “Framework on 
Pacific Regionalism” to replace the 
2005 Pacific Plan. 
Papua New Guinea and Fiji con-
tinued to joust over regional leader-
ship, while smaller Island countries 
launched audacious challenges over 
the environment: Marshall Island-
ers spoke out at the United Nations 
(UN) Climate Summit and used the 
International Court of Justice to chal-
lenge nuclear proliferation. Across 
Melanesia, there was a renewed focus 
on human rights in West Papua and 
debate over relations with Indonesia, 
at a time of increased Pacific engage-
ment with booming Asian economies.
The conservative Australian gov-
ernment led by Prime Minister Tony 
Abbott adopted policies on climate, 
aid, and security that clashed with 
the priorities of other Forum member 
countries. Abbott’s hosting of the 
Group of Twenty (g20) meeting in 
Brisbane highlighted his isolation on 
climate change, but the November 
summit of major powers also provided 
an important opportunity for interna-
tional engagement: Chinese President 
Xi Jinping, Indian Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi, and French President 
François Hollande made flying visits 
to Island nations after the summit, 
pledging new initiatives on investment, 
infrastructure, and training.
All of these changes are intersect-
ing in new and dynamic ways, with 
University of the South Pacific (usp) 
scholar Sandra Tarte arguing that 
“they constitute a deeper transfor-
mation, not just of the regional 
architecture, but of the regional order 
itself” (2014).
The September national elections 
in Fiji opened the way for Fiji’s reinte-
gration into regional economic, secu-
rity, and political institutions—though 
that process will come with conditions 
from the victorious FijiFirst govern-
ment led by Prime Minister Voreqe 
Bainimarama. Voters also went to the 
polls in Niue (April), New Caledonia 
(May), Cook Islands (July),  Solomon 
Islands (November), and Tonga 
(November). 
The return to office of Toke Talagi 
allowed the Niue premier to take 
a more assertive stand in regional 
institutions. After the 2014 Forum 
leaders’ meeting, Talagi threatened to 
withdraw his country from the Smaller 
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Island States (sis) caucus, criticizing 
the regional body for not addressing 
core concerns for sis nations. Talagi 
complained: “We’re promised assis-
tance but at the end of the day, . . .
since I’ve been part of the Forum 
there’s been no substantial difference 
in the manner in which we are treated 
versus those in the larger countries. 
We don’t get any special assistance 
from the donor funding, we don’t get 
any special allocation of resources 
provided for the Pacific Islands Forum 
from regional institutions and so on. 
So I don’t see any particular reason 
why we should continue” (Pacnews 
2014b).
In New Caledonia, a 2013 split in 
the anti-independence Rassemblement-
ump party led to a significant vic-
tory by Philippe Gomes’s Calédonie 
Ensemble party during May 2014 
elections. The incoming New Cale-
donian Congress is balanced between 
29 opponents of independence and 
25 supporters of independence, and 
French President Hollande’s Novem-
ber visit did not break the logjam 
over New Caledonia’s future political 
status (Maclellan 2015a). 
A postelection pact between three 
competing anti-independence  parties 
lasted less than six months, as the 
 multiparty Government of New 
Cale donia led by President Cynthia 
Ligeard collapsed in December (Calé-
donie Ensemble’s Philippe Germain 
was chosen as president in April 2015 
after a four-month delay, with the 
support of flnks ministers). Politics 
in the French Pacific will remain in 
flux as New Caledonia moves toward 
a referendum on self-determination 
in late 2018 and French Polynesia 
adjusts to the post-Flosse era, after 
long-serving President  Gaston Flosse 
was removed from office in September 
following  numerous convictions for 
abuse of public funds.
In Honiara, the first elections 
since the end of the Regional Assis-
tance Mission to Solomon Islands 
(ramsi) saw the shocking defeat of 
Prime  Minister Gordon Darcy Lilo. 
The  subsequent coalition building by 
incoming Prime Minister Manasseh 
Sogavare opens the way for sig-
nificant changes in regional relations. 
Although Solomon Islands remains the 
third-largest recipient of Australian 
aid, worth a$168 million in 2014–15 
(the Australian dollar averaged around 
us$.90 in 2014), the previous Soga-
vare government in 2006–07 engaged 
in forthright clashes with Canberra 
over priorities for development fund-
ing and attempts to arrest then Attor-
ney General Julian Moti. 
In Tonga, the December victory 
for longtime democracy campaigner 
‘Akilisi Pohiva highlighted the new 
dynamism of regional politics. Pohiva 
is the first prime minister to win 
a democratic popular vote in the 
 kingdom, and his election symbolizes 
calls for greater accountability across 
the region.
Throughout the year, Pacific gov-
ernments and member agencies of the 
Council of Regional Organizations of 
the Pacific allocated extensive time to 
preparation for a series of global sum-
mits and negotiations in 2014–2015. 
The theme of the annual meeting of 
the Pacific Islands Forum in Palau was 
“The Ocean: Life & Future.” After a 
week of events focused on fisheries, 
marine protected areas, and the impact 
of climate change on the marine envi-
ronment, leaders adopted the “Palau 
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Declaration on The Ocean—Life and 
Future” (pifs 2014b, 3). 
The July Forum meeting served as 
a springboard for launching Pacific 
priorities into the Third International 
Conference on Small Island Develop-
ing States (sids), held in Sāmoa in 
September. This conference brought 
together UN member governments to 
review action on sids following previ-
ous meetings in Barbados (1994) and 
Mauritius (2005). At the sids con-
ference, Pacific nations promoted poli-
cies on fisheries, climate, and vulnera-
bility and launched the Pacific Oceans 
Alliance to coordinate regional and 
international action on marine conser-
vation and fisheries  management. 
Growing coordination on fisher-
ies was evident at the Parties to the 
Nauru Agreement (pna) meeting in 
Honiara in March and the Western 
and Central Pacific Fisheries Commis-
sion in Apia in December. The deci-
sion by pna ceo Transform Aqorau 
to finish his term of office at the end 
of 2014 marked a significant change 
for an organization that is one of the 
success stories of Pacific regionalism. 
Regional cooperation was high-
lighted by the entry into force of the 
Niue Treaty Subsidiary Agreement 
in August and the finalization of an 
agreement between the United States 
and seventeen members of the Forum 
Fisheries Agency in October. Under 
this deal, US-flagged purse seine ves-
sels can fish for a total of 8,300 days 
across the region in 2015, in return for 
a payment of us$90 million. 
Island countries are strengthening 
a range of mechanisms to engage at 
the global level. The sids conference 
in Apia adopted the samoa Path-
way (sids Accelerated Modalities 
of Action) as a new Island-centered 
manifesto, which was promoted at 
subsequent international meetings, 
including UN Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-moon’s Climate Summit in New 
York (September), the g20 meeting in 
Brisbane (November), and the latest 
round of global climate negotiations in 
Lima (December). 
Forum leaders endorsed New Zea-
land’s successful bid to secure a two-
year term on the UN Security Council 
from 2015, replacing Australia in the 
rotating seat reserved for the Western 
European and Others Group. Some 
hoped that New Zealand might get 
better results than Australia in advanc-
ing the Islands’ bid for a Security 
Council resolution on climate change 
and security. 
Many Pacific governments are 
increasingly reluctant to allow Austra-
lia and New Zealand to speak on their 
behalf in international institutions. 
Although regular meetings continue 
between all Forum ambassadors at 
the United Nations, the Pacific Small 
Island Developing States (psids) 
group also caucuses separately, with-
out Australia and New Zealand. 
During a visit to New Zealand in 
August, Fiji Prime Minister Bainima-
rama said: “Australia . . . went 
around three or four years ago telling 
the people of the Pacific ‘if you vote 
us in for the UN Security Council, 
we’ll look after your affairs.’ What 
affairs? The biggest problem we have 
is climate change and the Australians 
say ‘No thank you—you just vote us 
in . . . our issue of climate change is 
totally different to yours and we’re not 
going to help you when we get there’” 
(abc 2014).
The Forum Secretariat was not 
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invited as an observer at the g20 
meeting (unlike the African Union and 
the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations), but major powers used the 
opportunity of a southern hemisphere 
trip to directly engage with Pacific 
governments. 
Indian Prime Minister Modi trav-
eled to Suva after the g20 meeting, 
receiving a warm welcome from Fiji’s 
large Indo-Fijian population and hold-
ing discussions with the newly elected 
Bainimarama government. Chinese 
President Xi Jinping also reaffirmed 
China’s growing engagement with 
Island countries as he met with six 
Beijing-aligned leaders at a post-g20 
summit in Nadi. Sāmoa Prime Minis-
ter Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi said, 
“I think we have to recognise the very 
special effort of China and India for 
their leaders to come all the way to 
Fiji, which is more central, to meet 
with all the Pacific leaders” (Pacnews 
2014a).
Xi reiterated pledges made at a 
2013 China-Pacific summit, offering 
two thousand scholarships for study 
in China, zero-tariff preference for 
97 percent of Pacific imports, and 
efforts to ensure more Chinese doctors 
and tourists will travel to the Pacific. 
Modi announced a us$1 million 
regional climate change adaptation 
fund, visas on arrival in India for 
citizens of all fourteen Forum Island 
countries, and a new, regular summit 
on India-Pacific cooperation. 
Given Fiji’s postcoup isolation, the 
first state visit by a Chinese president 
was a success for Prime Minister 
Bainimarama, who noted that “it’s 
a clear sign both of the deep ties we 
have developed and the importance 
that China places on Fiji’s leadership 
in the Pacific” (Fiji Ministry of Infor-
mation 2014). 
Beijing and New Delhi, in strategic 
competition on the global stage, both 
wooed host nation Fiji with specific 
pledges. Xi proposed visa exemp-
tions for Fijians traveling to China 
and a new Chinese cultural center 
(China has funded an expansion of 
the Confucius Institute from usp’s 
central campus in Suva to Lautoka to 
promote Chinese-language lessons and 
cultural programs in the west of Fiji). 
New offers of training programs sup-
plement an existing scheme through 
which sixty-five senior officers selected 
by Fiji’s Public Service Commission 
have gone to China for training and 
orientation since 2012.
India in turn offered a parliamen-
tary library, us$5 million for small 
businesses, and a us$70 million credit 
line for cogeneration power plants for 
Fiji’s troubled sugar industry. 
At a time of travel bans and aid 
sanctions on the postcoup regime in 
Fiji, China’s recent engagement has 
been praised by the Bainimarama 
government. As China’s Fiji-based 
Ambassador Huang Yong finished his 
three-year posting in January 2015, 
Fiji Foreign Minister Ratu Inoke 
Kubuabola praised China’s solidar-
ity: “As a nation, China demonstrated 
that it was a true friend of Fiji when 
virtually the rest of the world shut its 
doors on us. China stood firm and 
supported us, demonstrating a deep 
understanding of our situation and 
further showing utmost respect for Fiji 
as a sovereign nation trying to rebuild 
itself. It did not shut the door on us, 
nor did it just stand by and watch” 
(Pratibha 2015).
China has not focused on Fiji alone. 
492 the contemporary pacific • 27:2 (2015)
In the last decade, Pacific imports 
from China have increased from 
2 percent to 15 percent of regional 
trade, although much of the invest-
ment through China’s EximBank is 
targeted on Papua New Guinea (Busi-
ness Advantage PNG 2014). Other 
countries are vying for the Chinese 
tourism dollar or bilateral infrastruc-
ture grants. They also benefit from 
regional initiatives, such as the tour 
of China’s Peace Ark in August and 
September. This People’s Liberation 
Army (pla) Navy hospital ship made 
port calls in Tonga, Fiji, Vanuatu, and 
Papua New Guinea, providing medi-
cal assistance to local communities. 
China’s “Mission Harmony 2014” 
aimed to soften the reputation of the 
pla, after criticism of the provision of 
Chinese military aid to security forces 
in these countries.
Other nontraditional donors are 
strengthening their links to regional 
organizations. Cuba attended its 
first Forum meeting as a Post-Forum 
Dialogue Partner in Palau, while Spain 
and Turkey were granted Dialogue 
Partner status at the July meeting. The 
United Arab Emirates has reconfirmed 
funding for the Pacific Islands Devel-
opment Forum, extending ties that 
began after Fiji established an embassy 
in Abu Dhabi in 2010. 
With the Obama administration’s 
Pacific pivot focused more on Asia 
than on the Islands, the US gov-
ernment is not as nimble as some of 
these smaller development partners. 
Despite the March commencement 
of the us$24 million Pacific America 
 Climate Fund and the July announce-
ment of Judith Beth Cefkin as the 
new US ambassador for Fiji and the 
southwest Pacific, the United States is 
still playing catch-up.
The one Western nation that 
improved its diplomatic posture 
during 2014 was France. Following 
the g20 meeting, President Hollande 
and Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius 
made a flying visit to Nouméa. They 
joined a high-level dialogue on cli-
mate change at the Secretariat of the 
Pacific Community (spc), attended 
by prime ministers and presidents 
from  Vanuatu, Kiribati, Niue, Tuvalu, 
and Cook Islands and diplomats 
from other Pacific nations. Hollande 
stressed that France would remain a 
Pacific power, welcomed by its neigh-
bors: “That wasn’t always the case in 
past decades. But today, they ask us to 
remain present, because we can also 
help assure the future of the region” 
(Maclellan 2014b).
The Island leaders welcomed 
France’s role as host of crucial cli-
mate treaty negotiations to be held in 
Paris in December 2015. One of the 
pillars of a global deal in Paris will 
be adequate and accessible climate 
finance for vulnerable countries, and 
Hollande highlighted France’s us$1 
billion contribution to the Green Cli-
mate Fund, a new global mechanism 
to respond to the ravages of climate 
change in developing countries (this 
follows US President Barack Obama’s 
us$3 billion pledge to the fund). 
The contrast with Canberra could 
not be sharper. During the year, the 
conservative Coalition government 
abolished the carbon-pricing system 
established by the previous Labor 
government, dismantled the offi-
cial Climate Commission, proposed 
changes to Australia’s Renewable 
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Energy Target, and announced expan-
sion of exports of coal, gas, and other 
fossil fuels. As he opened the us$3.4 
billion Caval Ridge coal mine in cen-
tral Queensland, Prime Minister Tony 
Abbott said: “Coal is good for human-
ity, coal is good for prosperity, coal 
is an essential part of our economic 
future, here in Australia, and right 
around the world” (Sydney Morning 
Herald 2014).
These climate policies drew sharp 
criticism from Pacific community lead-
ers. Convenor of the Pacific Islands 
Climate Action Network Shirley 
Laban said: “If Australian and New 
Zealand leaders refuse to do their 
share to address the issue, they send a 
very poor signal to the global com-
munity. Pacific communities will reap 
the devastating consequences of their 
failure to act for generations to come” 
(Matangi Tonga Magazine 2014). 
Thirty climate activists from twelve 
Pacific nations traveled to New South 
Wales in October to protest Australia’s 
coal exports. These Pacific Climate 
Warriors used traditional canoes from 
Vanuatu, Tokelau, Tonga, and other 
countries for a protest fleet, which 
attempted to blockade Newcastle’s 
harbor, Australia’s largest port for 
coal exports. 
The differences on climate policy 
between Australia and New Zea-
land and their Pacific neighbors was 
symbolized by the decision of prime 
ministers Tony Abbott and John Key 
to miss the UN Climate Summit on 
23 September (Abbott was in New 
York the day before but decided not 
to participate in the summit alongside 
120 other world leaders). The opening 
ceremony was notable for the address 
by Marshallese poet Kathy Jetnil-
Kijiner, who presented “Dear Matafele 
Peinem,” a moving tribute to her 
daughter that highlighted Pacific resis-
tance to the threat of global warming 
(Jetnil-Kijiner 2014).
At the summit, Marshall Islands 
Foreign Affairs Minister Tony de 
Brum stated: “Probably one of the 
most frustrating events of the past 
year for Pacific islanders is Australia’s 
strange behavior when it comes to 
climate change. It just does not make 
sense. It goes against the grain of the 
world. Not only [is Australia] our big 
brother down south, Australia is a 
member of the Pacific Islands Forum 
and Australia is a Pacific island, a big 
island, but a Pacific island. It must 
recognize that it has a responsibility. 
The problems that have befallen the 
smaller countries are also Australia’s 
problems” (O’Malley 2014).
For fourteen months after its 
September 2013 election, the Abbott 
 government refused to contribute to 
the Green Climate Fund. However, 
at the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (unfccc) cli-
mate negotiations in December 2014, 
Australia finally buckled to diplomatic 
pressure, announcing a grant to the 
fund of a$200 million (us$165 mil-
lion at the exchange rate at that time), 
which was well below the amounts 
contributed by the United States, 
Germany, France, and other developed 
countries.
Anger over Canberra’s climate 
policy extended to other sectors, 
following a series of decisions by the 
Abbott government on aid, trade, 
and regional communications that 
adversely affected Island nations. 
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Despite extensive regional travel by 
Foreign Affairs Minister Julie Bishop 
and Parliamentary Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs Brett Mason, Austra-
lian foreign policy in 2014 was more 
focused on trade with Asia, global 
terrorism, and the loss of Australians 
in Ukraine’s Malaysia Airlines flight 
17 disaster. Prime Minister Abbott did 
not attend the Forum leaders’ meet-
ing in Palau—his first opportunity to 
engage with Pacific counterparts on 
crucial decisions such as the selection 
of a new Forum secretary-general.
Bishop’s authority was undercut 
when another conservative minister 
was sent to monitor her actions at 
the unfccc climate negotiations in 
Lima. Her parliamentary secretary, 
Brett Mason, attended the Forum in 
Palau and in November wrote about 
the importance of Pacific regional-
ism (Mason 2014). The following 
month he was sacked and replaced 
by an Abbott loyalist in a ministerial 
reshuffle. 
Bishop was also unable to protect 
the Australian aid budget, with the 
Coalition government abandoning 
Australia’s bipartisan commitment to 
increase Official Development Assis-
tance (oda) to 0.5 percent of gross 
national income. Pacific governments 
lost over a$60 million in bilateral and 
regional aid in January, when the gov-
ernment slashed a$650 million from 
the 2013–14 aid budget—six months 
into the financial year. 
As 2014 progressed, the Abbott 
government announced that another 
a$11 billion will be cut from the 
planned expansion of oda over the 
next four years. After a a$7.6 billion 
reduction in the May national budget, 
Treasurer Joe Hockey announced a 
further cut of a$3.7 billion over four 
years in December. Although these 
cuts had more immediate impact on 
Africa and other regions, the reduction 
of Australia’s aid will severely affect 
the Pacific in coming years.
The government’s decision to 
abandon the a$250 million contract 
for Australia tv—the international 
television station managed by the 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
(abc)—also had a devastating impact 
on Radio Australia (Maclellan 2014c). 
For many Islanders, the abc’s short-
wave, satellite, and Internet broadcasts 
are a crucial source of regional and 
international news. Ending the tv 
 contract with just three months’ notice 
led to the dismissal of eighty staff 
(including long-serving Pacific corre-
spondent Sean Dorney), the abandon-
ment of satellite radio broadcasting 
to the northern Pacific, proposals to 
abandon shortwave transmission, and 
the gutting of foreign language ser-
vices (including Tok Pisin broadcasts 
to Papua New Guinea, a vital service 
for more than forty years). This deci-
sion damaged Australian soft power 
at a time when other international 
broadcasters—from Al Jazeera to 
Chinese tv—are expanding their reach 
in the region.
Despite these decisions, Australia 
remains the largest aid, trade, and mil-
itary power in the South Pacific. Island 
governments are reluctant to burn 
bridges with Canberra, especially as 
nontraditional development partners 
have yet to establish a track record for 
effective assistance (some officials, for 
example, have criticized the quality of 
Cuban medical training, while China’s 
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infrastructure programs have been 
challenged for poor construction stan-
dards or the use of Chinese labor). 
Current tensions with Canberra 
have reinforced a trend toward the 
new Pacific diplomacy (Fry 2015). 
Forum Island Countries are taking 
unprecedented political and diplo-
matic initiatives and using structures 
like the Melanesian Spearhead Group 
(msg) or the psids group in New 
York as vehicles to advance their 
policies on trade, labor mobility, or 
decolonization.
Fiji is a key player in this transi-
tion, with the postcoup administration 
looking beyond existing networks like 
the Forum and the Commonwealth. 
Fiji’s 2011 membership in the Non-
Aligned Movement and 2013 role 
as chair of the Group of 77 (g77) 
plus China in the United Nations are 
 examples of this new trend under 
Foreign Minister Kubuabola and UN 
Ambassador Peter Thomson. How-
ever, the Bainimarama government is 
not alone in seeking new options. Fiji’s 
assertive foreign policy is a reflec-
tion of broader regional trends as 
all  governments position themselves 
in relationship to emerging Asian 
 economies.
A new generation of leaders is 
critiquing traditional aid mechanisms 
and the conditionality that typifies 
many Western aid programs. Vanuatu 
Lands Minister Ralph Regenvanu 
has initiated new programs on land 
reform that challenge past neoliberal 
policies on privatization of commu-
nal land. Critiquing regional trade 
policy, Governor Gary Juffa of PNG’s 
Oro Province stated: “We cannot let 
Western countries pull wool over our 
eyes—and Australia and New Zealand 
produce the finest wool in the world. 
I believe that if the Pacific is to benefit 
from its own resources—rather than 
waiting under the table for the crumbs 
of its resources—it must be able to rise 
up and stop being too ‘pacific.’ We 
have been the friendly islands for too 
long” (Sergel and Scott 2013).
With effective control of the Asian 
Development Bank (adb) resting with 
Japan and the World Bank dominated 
by the United States, Island govern-
ments are investigating alternative 
sources of financing from China and 
other developing nations. While they 
are welcoming ongoing aid from 
Western allies and maintaining engage-
ment with the Multilateral Develop-
ment Banks (mdbs), contact with 
nontraditional partners is being used 
to leverage better deals or challenge 
the conditions that come with mdb 
loans. There is a new emphasis on 
South-South cooperation and trilateral 
aid programs, such as a China–New 
Zealand–Cook Islands water supply 
program, New Zealand cooperation 
with Cuba and Island nations on cer-
tification of doctors, and a proposed 
PNG–China–Australia project on 
malaria control (undp China 2014).
For many years, Pacific govern-
ments have drawn on the Pacific 
Region Infrastructure Facility, funded 
by Australia, New Zealand, Japan, 
and the European Union. However, 
there is potential for new infrastruc-
ture investment after China’s 2014 
decision to establish the Asia Infra-
structure Investment Bank (aiib), with 
start-up capital of us$50 billion. US 
Secretary of State John Kerry report-
edly asked Australian Prime Minister 
496 the contemporary pacific • 27:2 (2015)
Abbott not to join the aiib as a found-
ing member, and Australia joined 
Japan, Indonesia, and South Korea in 
boycotting the aiib’s launch (Aus-
tralian Financial Review 2014). The 
2014 creation of the brics Develop-
ment Bank (backed by the develop-
ing nation bloc led by Brazil, Russia, 
India, China, and South Africa) also 
reflects this transformation on the 
global stage. 
Island leaders are bemused when 
they face criticism for engaging with 
Beijing or New Delhi. New Zealand 
commenced trade negotiations with 
China in December 2004 and con-
cluded a free-trade agreement in April 
2008. In 2014, Australia finalized a 
bilateral free-trade agreement with 
China and sought to expand  uranium 
sales to India, while Wellington and 
Beijing signed an NZ-PRC Joint 
Statement on the Establishment of a 
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership 
in November (at the same time New 
Zealand has been moving closer to 
its anzus partners on security policy, 
resuming involvement in regional mili-
tary exercises like rimpac). 
Fiji’s role in the Pacific regional 
architecture remains a central chal-
lenge and conundrum. The September 
elections opened a new period of 
engagement between Prime Minister 
Bainimarama and other Forum mem-
bers. At the same time there is ongoing 
uncertainty and even some resentment 
over Suva’s assertive regional postures.
In January 2014, the Forum Min-
isterial Contact Group visited Fiji, 
opening the way for reengagement 
with the Bainimarama regime after the 
elections. Australian Foreign Minister 
Bishop announced that her country 
would reestablish military ties, joint 
exercises, and officer education with 
the Fiji Military Forces. Australia 
agreed to cochair, with Indonesia, the 
Multinational Observer Group that 
would monitor Fiji’s election pro-
cess. The European Union and Papua 
New Guinea also pledged funding to 
support an effective electoral process. 
Bainimarama made his first postcoup 
visit to Australia and New Zealand 
in August, seeking support from 
Fiji  diasporic communities but also 
reopening engagement with the largest 
Forum members. 
The September election, ruled as 
“credible” by the observer group, 
opened the way for Fiji to come in 
from the cold (Fiji Electoral Office 
2014). By year’s end, Fijian villagers 
were being recruited into Australia’s 
Seasonal Worker Program (swp) and 
New Zealand’s Recognized Seasonal 
Employer (rse) scheme, from which 
they’d been excluded since the 2006 
Fiji coup. Even as Suva was build-
ing ties with China and India, the Fiji 
government welcomed support from 
the European Union, the World Bank, 
and the adb, which all reopened dis-
cussion on long-delayed development 
projects. By December, the adb had 
agreed on a us$100 million loan for 
transport infrastructure, a major step 
in a new five-year Country Partnership 
Strategy for 2014–2018.
Most Pacific governments have 
welcomed Fiji’s renewed involvement 
in trade talks and other regional initia-
tives. In October, Bainimarama joined 
Tuvalu Prime Minister Enele Sopoaga 
to sign a Maritime Boundary Treaty—
the first such agreement in thirty 
years. After their countries’ elections, 
Australian Foreign Minister Bishop 
and Fiji Prime Minister Bainimarama 
political reviews • region in review 497
met over cocktails and agreed to host 
a February 2015 meeting on Pacific 
regional architecture, with the subtext 
of encouraging Fiji to rejoin the Pacific 
Islands Forum (see Fry 2015), though 
the meeting was later postponed. 
All this goodwill has not softened 
Bainimarama’s proposals for Forum 
restructuring. Fiji’s Foreign Ministry 
has been developing a proposal that 
Australia and New Zealand take on a 
new role as donors and development 
partners rather than as equal members 
alongside Forum Island Countries. 
Fiji is arguing the case for reform with 
neighboring countries, with Foreign 
Minister Kubuabola raising the topic 
with incoming Tongan Prime Minister 
Pohiva during a visit to Nuku‘alofa. In 
December, Kubuabola noted: “If it is 
consensus that Pacific Islands perceive 
these two developed countries should 
have a place at the regional gover-
nance table, then it is only fair that 
room should be made for other devel-
opment partners which are interested 
in joining them at the table. . . . The 
rationalisation of regional architecture 
for the Pacific Islands should have the 
best interest of Pacific Islands at its 
heart” (Fiji Sun 2014).
Throughout the year, Fiji’s neigh-
bors reacted with some ambivalence 
to the Bainimarama government’s 
regional assertiveness. In spite of 
cooperation in many sectors, there 
have been occasional spats in the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group and 
Pacific Islands Forum as Fiji and 
Papua New Guinea joust for regional 
leadership. Relations were strained by 
Fiji’s refusal to appoint the PNG high 
commissioner as dean of the diplo-
matic corps in Suva, Bainimarama’s 
absence from the special msg leaders’ 
summit in Port Moresby, and the deci-
sion to reappoint Solomon Islander 
Peter Forau as director-general of the 
msg Secretariat in Port Vila. A 2013 
agreement to back former Fiji Foreign 
Minister Kaliopate Tavola as the msg 
candidate to replace outgoing Forum 
Secretary-General Tuiloma Neroni 
Slade was scuttled when Papua New 
Guinea and Solomon Islands both 
nominated candidates for the position. 
In Palau, PNG Prime Minister 
Peter O’Neill and Solomon Islands 
Prime Minister Lilo took a walk 
under the trees during the official 
retreat on  Peleliu Island, while other 
leaders debated the choice of PNG’s 
Dame Meg Taylor over Solomon 
Islander Jimmie Rodgers, a former 
spc director-general. Taylor, a for-
mer PNG ambassador to the United 
Nations and long-serving World Bank 
group expert, emerged as the success-
ful  candidate. She joined two other 
women, Deputy Secretary-Generals 
Andie Fong Toy and Cristelle Pratt, in 
an unprecedented female leadership 
team in the Forum  Secretariat.
Former Solomon Islands High 
Commissioner to Australia Milner 
Tozaka said that Honiara’s decision 
not to back Tavola’s candidacy led to 
“payback” through a dispute between 
Fiji Airways and Solomon Airlines 
over landing rights (Radio New Zea-
land International 2014). Beyond this 
contest for the crucial regional post, 
disputes over West Papua also caused 
some tension between msg member 
nations, as discussed later in this 
review. Both Vanuatu and New Cale-
donia’s Front de Libération Nationale 
Kanak et Socialiste (flnks) indepen-
dence movement were critical of Fiji’s 
rapprochement with Indonesia.
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These political tensions did not 
overshadow closer trade and invest-
ment ties between Papua New Guinea 
and Fiji. Even with potential rev-
enues affected by the late-2014 fall 
in oil prices, PNG companies and 
government authorities are expand-
ing  operations around the region. 
PNG investment in Fiji amounts to 
nearly 300 million kina (approxi-
mately us$114 million as of late 
2014), including the Pearl South 
Pacific Resort at Pacific Harbor and 
the newly reopened Grand Pacific 
Hotel in Suva, a joint venture between 
PNG’s national superannuation fund 
nasfund; the Fiji National Provident 
Fund; and Lamana Development, a 
privately owned property developer in 
Port Moresby. More than twenty PNG 
companies have an estimated si$500 
million (approximately us$67.25 
million in September 2014) invested 
in Solomon Islands, including Bank 
of the South Pacific (bsp), Lamana, 
BeMobile, Ela Motors, Tower 
 Insurance, and Air Niugini (Post 
 Courier 2014). 
At year’s end, bsp purchased the 
regional operations of Australian bank 
Westpac for a$125 million. Westpac 
will continue banking services in the 
larger markets of Papua New Guinea 
and Fiji but will transfer to bsp the 
control of operations in Sāmoa, Cook 
Islands, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, 
and Tonga. 
Anticipating significant revenue 
flows from the exploitation of oil and 
gas reserves, Papua New Guinea is 
making small but significant develop-
ment contributions to the Smaller 
Island States. At the Forum in Palau, 
Prime Minister O’Neill announced a 
regional sis package of 300 million 
kina (Port Moresby has offered us$2 
million to rebuild Niue’s parliament as 
well as climate funding to atoll nations 
and has even proposed to establish an 
sis secretariat in Port Moresby).
Despite these gestures, the two 
largest Melanesian nations continue 
to protect their interests in regional 
negotiations for an Economic Part-
nership Agreement (epa) with the 
 European Union (EU) and the pacer 
Plus agreement with Australia and 
New Zealand.
In 2014, Island nations lobbied 
the European Union to extend the 
benefits from interim agreements into 
a comprehensive regional epa (the 
treaty was supposed to be finalized 
in 2007, so Papua New Guinea and 
Fiji have signed interim epas with the 
European Commission in the mean-
time, to protect their fish and sugar 
exports). Trade and fisheries ministers 
from Pacific members of the African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific (pacp) group 
met in Fiji in April to provide pacp 
negotiators with clear directions on 
how to conclude the long-running 
negotiations. The European Union 
continues to play hardball on fisher-
ies, which has been a stumbling block 
to finalizing the deal, as Pacific states 
seek an extension to global sourcing 
provisions for fresh, frozen, and dried 
fish products. 
Between 2008 and 2013, the Euro-
pean Union granted €845.5 million in 
development assistance to the Pacific, 
including €68.5 million allocated 
specifically to supporting regional 
integration through trade (the euro 
averaged us$1.31 over this six-year 
period). Beyond trade, however, the 
epa could provide a framework for 
future relations with the European 
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Union because of the looming expiry 
of the 2000 Cotonou Agreement. In 
April, pifs Deputy Secretary-General 
Andie Fong Toy noted: “We must 
recognise that the epa as a trade agree-
ment may be more valuable for certain 
countries than others in the region. 
However, of mutual importance to all 
Pacific acp States is our relation with 
the EU. At this stage we are unsure of 
what the nature, shape and form of 
a new agreement with the EU will be 
after the expiry of the Cotonou Agree-
ment in 2020” (acp 2014).
Negotiations for the pacer Plus 
agreement began in 2009, and Forum 
members have agreed on draft text for 
a number of chapters under the direc-
tion of Chief Trade Advisor Edwini 
Kessie. However, the finalization of 
the trade treaty has been delayed by 
Fiji’s long absence from negotiations 
and the failure of Australia and New 
Zealand to provide flexible arrange-
ments for smaller Island states on 
labor mobility and funding for struc-
tural adjustment.
By late 2014, the draft chapter on 
trade in services was nearly concluded, 
though there remained a range of 
other contentious issues that must be 
resolved if the treaty is to be com-
pleted by late 2015. For example, 
Australia and New Zealand are also 
strongly opposed to an Infant Indus-
try Clause proposed by Forum Island 
countries (fics), which would protect 
small-scale manufacturing in Island 
nations against cheaper Australia and 
New Zealand (ANZ) goods. 
Island nations have welcomed 
access to the ANZ horticulture sector 
through the swp and rse schemes, but 
they argue that increased access into 
ANZ labor markets should be made 
legally binding under pacer Plus—
a policy resisted by Canberra and 
Wellington. fics have requested that 
Australia and New Zealand establish 
a dedicated Aid for Trade fund in their 
oda programs, arguing “that imple-
mentation of the pacer Plus Agree-
ment would need to be complemented 
with adequate broader trade related 
assistance to address supply side con-
straints facing the fics” (pifs 2014a).
As these regional trade negotiations 
dragged on, Pacific governments con-
tinued to develop subregional agree-
ments to expand existing commercial 
links between like-minded nations.
At the sids conference in Septem-
ber, Palau, Marshall Islands, and 
the Federated States of Micronesia 
(FSM) signed a historic Micronesia 
Trade and Economic Treaty, promot-
ing increased economic engagement 
across the northern Pacific. FSM 
President Emmanuel Mori described 
the new treaty as a “true reflection of 
the Micronesian spirit of collabora-
tion which characterized the relations 
between the three entities.” The treaty 
“endeavors towards the creation of 
a Micronesian trade and economic 
community through the promotion 
of  sub-regional trade and  economic 
 cooperation and integration” 
(mtc 2014). 
Although starting with the 
 Compact of Free Association nations, 
other Micronesian states like Kiribati, 
Nauru, Guam, and the Common-
wealth of Northern Mariana Islands 
(CNMI) are eligible to join the new 
economic community. The treaty 
reflects wider cooperation across the 
northern Pacific, such as the December 
2013 meeting of Micronesian Chief 
Executives in Saipan, CNMI (Eugenio 
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2014), or the July 2014 Micronesian 
Games in Pohnpei, FSM.
Given the slow pace of negotiations 
with the European Union, Australia, 
and New Zealand, msg ministers 
are advancing a range of subregional 
initiatives on trade and labor mobil-
ity. These include the negotiation 
of a third phase of the msg Trade 
Agreement (msgta3), a shipping 
study, a Skills Movement Scheme, and 
strengthened cooperation on customs 
and biosecurity. msg finance ministers 
and Central Bank governors are inves-
tigating the creation of a Melanesian 
Development and Investment Fund 
as well as an Emergency Stabilization 
Fund to deal with global currency 
crises.
msg trade ministers met in Papua 
New Guinea in November to adopt 
the Port Moresby Declaration “Secur-
ing msg Prosperity through Trade and 
Economic Integration.” The declara-
tion calls for the creation by 2017 of 
an msg Free Trade Area, an Invest-
ment Promotion and Protection agree-
ment, and treaties on double taxation. 
Even within subregional agree-
ments, the larger economies stand to 
benefit more from new trade deals. 
Papua New Guinea will host the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(apec) meeting in 2018, boosting its 
integration into Asian markets (PNG 
trade with China already represents 
80 percent of the total trade between 
China and the Islands). 
Facing labor shortages in its 
expanding resources sector, Papua 
New Guinea is seeking to increase 
labor mobility from other msg 
countries. In November, PNG Foreign 
Affairs Minister Rimbink Pato noted: 
“For PNG, we want to enable every 
other msg country to come and live 
in PNG freely. All you need is a Fijian, 
Vanuatu or Solomon passport and 
you are welcome to come and work 
and live in PNG. We are about msg 
integration and trade mobility con-
nectivity to South East Asia through 
PNG as we are the only country in 
the Pacific with links by physical land 
border with Indonesia and to the great 
economies of South East Asia” (Devi 
2014).
Relations with Indonesia, however, 
are affected by growing regional con-
cern over human rights abuses by the 
Indonesian armed forces and police 
in West Papua. The Pacific Islands 
Forum has not formally addressed 
the West Papua issue for a decade, 
so debate has shifted into the Mela-
nesian  Spearhead Group.
In 2014, Melanesian leaders 
considered an application for msg 
membership lodged the previous year 
by the West Papuan National Council 
for Liberation (wpncl). Implementing 
a decision of the 2013 msg summit, 
Fiji Foreign Minister Kubuabola led a 
ministerial mission to Indonesia and 
West Papua in January to investigate 
the application. The Vanuatu govern-
ment decided to boycott the mission, 
arguing “the Mission’s program 
would not allow the msg to obtain 
credible information to fulfil the 
msg Leaders mandate” (msg 2014). 
Their judgment was reinforced when 
Indonesian officials refused access to 
pro-independence church and civil 
society representatives during a brief 
visit to Jayapura. 
Indonesia’s diplomatic lobbying 
was rewarded at a special msg lead-
ers’ summit in Port Moresby in June, 
which deferred the wpncl application 
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for membership and agreed “to invite 
all groups to form an inclusive and 
united umbrella group in consultation 
with Indonesia to work on submitting 
a fresh application” (msg 2014). msg 
leaders agreed on the need for greater 
engagement with the Melanesian peo-
ple of West Papua, through cultural 
and sporting ties (such as participation 
in the 5th Melanesian Festival of Arts 
and Culture, which was held in July in 
Papua New Guinea).
During his 2014 election cam-
paign, Indonesia’s new President Joko 
Widodo, universally known in Indo-
nesia as “Jokowi,” traveled twice to 
West Papua, promising a new era of 
dialogue between Jakarta and Jaya-
pura. In August, Jokowi met with 
West Papuan political, community, 
and church leaders, outlining new 
policies and pledging greater access 
for foreign journalists: “Why not? It’s 
safe here in Papua. There’s nothing to 
hide” (Maclellan 2014a).
However, Jokowi’s appointment of 
retired General Ryamizard Ryacudu 
as Indonesian defense minister threat-
ens to undermine these cautious steps 
toward reconciliation. As chief of the 
Indonesian army’s strategic command 
Kostrad in 2000–2002 and army 
chief of staff between 2002 and 2005, 
 Ryacudu was notorious for his role in 
the crushing of the “Papuan Spring.” 
He publicly supported Indonesian 
soldiers who had been arrested and 
convicted for the 2001 murder of 
Papua Presidium Council leader Theys 
Eluay (Chauvel 2005).
Ongoing ties between Suva and 
Jakarta were highlighted by the invita-
tion for outgoing Indonesian President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to open 
the 2014 Pacific Islands Development 
Forum—a key regional initiative of 
the Bainimarama government—and 
Indonesia’s role in cochairing the 2014 
Multinational Observer Group for 
Fiji’s elections. 
The West Papua debate will not 
go away, with increasing church and 
civil society criticism of governments 
in Canberra, Suva, and Port Moresby 
for their failure to address ongoing 
Indonesian human rights violations. 
Social media campaigns and public 
protests across Melanesia are slowly 
having an impact, especially in Papua 
New Guinea, where successive govern-
ments have been reluctant to criticize 
Indonesian policy because of security 
concerns along the land border. 
In a major speech in February 
2015, PNG Prime Minister Peter 
O’Neill said his country needed to do 
more to address human rights in West 
Papua. Proposing that his country take 
a lead in discussions with Indonesia 
“in a mature and engaging manner,” 
he added: “Sometimes we forgot our 
family, our brothers and sisters, espe-
cially those in West Papua. I think as 
a country the time has come for us to 
speak about oppression of our people. 
Pictures of brutality of our people 
appear daily on social media and yet 
we take no notice. We have the moral 
obligation to speak for those who are 
not allowed to talk. We must be the 
eyes for those who are blindfolded” 
(O’Neill 2015).
Vanuatu continues to lead regional 
support for West Papuan self-
determination. Prime Minister Joe 
Natuman hosted a December 2014 
meeting to bring together Jayapura-
based  activists and exiled campaign-
ers and form a united front between 
competing groups. The newly created 
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United Liberation Movement for 
West Papua unites three strands of the 
West Papuan nationalist movement: 
the wpncl, the Federal Republic of 
West Papua, and the National Parlia-
ment of West Papua, which incorpo-
rates the National Committee for West 
Papua. A renewed application for msg 
membership was submitted in January 
2015.
The issue of self-determination 
in Melanesia will increasingly push 
onto the regional and international 
agenda. The collapse of the Ligeard 
government in New Caledonia in 
late 2014 highlights the inability of 
anti- independence parties to agree on 
the best way to respond to the Kanak 
independence movement. After May 
elections, New Caledonia’s incom-
ing Congress and government have 
been unable to agree on a date for a 
referendum on self-determination in 
2015–2017, so the French state must 
organize this vote in late 2018. 
At the same time, the Bougain-
ville Peace Agreement states that a 
referendum on independence should 
be held between 2015 and 2020. At 
year’s end, the Bougainville Executive 
Council approved the creation of a 
new Office for the Bougainville Refer-
endum to manage relations with Port 
Moresby and prepare for this  crucial 
poll. As a sign of things to come, 
 Bougainville has changed its time 
zone to align with Solomon Islands 
and move an hour ahead of mainland 
Papua New Guinea.
On other security issues, Pacific 
governments have called on the United 
Nations to appoint a special represen-
tative on Climate Change and Security, 
recognizing that the adverse effects of 
climate change have strong implica-
tions for the security and well-being 
of their population. 
While climate change remains the 
central focus of psids lobbying on 
security, there has been a revival of 
action on the threat of nuclear weap-
ons, at a time when the international 
Red Cross/Red Crescent move-
ment and other civil society groups 
have renewed campaigning on the 
issue. Pacific delegates were active 
at three international conferences in 
2013–2014, in Norway, Mexico, and 
Austria, focusing on the humanitarian 
impact of nuclear weapons. 
In February 2014, Kiribati, 
 Marshall Islands, Papua New Guinea, 
Sāmoa, Tonga, and Tuvalu issued a 
joint statement at the Second Confer-
ence on the Humanitarian Impact of 
Nuclear Weapons in Nayarit, Mexico, 
declaring “that nuclear weapons 
must be outlawed and eliminated 
without delay.” They appealed to all 
non-nuclear weapons states to set the 
agenda for concrete steps toward the 
negotiation of a legally binding treaty, 
rather than wait for the nuclear-armed 
powers to lead the way: “Pacific Island 
nations have long called for a world 
free of nuclear weapons. Today, we 
reiterate our firm belief that the only 
way to guarantee that these  terrible 
weapons of mass destruction are never 
used again is to ban and eliminate 
them” (Nayarit 2014).
The lingering health and envi-
ronmental impacts of 315 nuclear 
tests in Australia and the Pacific 
Islands remain an ongoing concern, 
as detailed in a report by the Interna-
tional Campaign to Abolish Nuclear 
Weapons that was presented at the 
Nayarit conference (ican 2014). 
In French Polynesia, the long cam-
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paign by Moruroa e Tatou for cleanup 
and compensation after three decades 
of French nuclear testing is slowly 
changing policy in Paris. In Septem-
ber, the French government agreed to 
transfer responsibility for compensa-
tion from the Ministry of Defense to 
the Ministry of Health, a small step 
in removing the national security 
restrictions that have long constrained 
debate and hidden key evidence. 
A December 2013 UN General 
Assembly resolution called on the UN 
secretary-general to investigate the 
economic, social, and environmen-
tal impacts of thirty years of French 
nuclear testing. An initial report was 
released in July 2014 (unga 2014), 
but the Union for Democracy in 
French Polynesia continues to lobby 
for a more extensive scientific study. 
French Polynesian Senator Richard 
Tuheiava told the UN Fourth Commit-
tee in October, “We have concluded 
that the Report is far from compre-
hensive, and is rather a compilation 
of replies from just two UN agencies 
out of some 22 requests made by the 
Secretary-General” (Tuheiava 2014).
In April 2014, the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands (RMI) government 
expanded its long-standing campaign 
against nuclear weapons by filing 
landmark cases at the International 
Court of Justice (icj) and the US Fed-
eral District Court in San Francisco. 
Speaking to the UN General Assembly 
in September, RMI President Chris-
topher Loeak stated, “It is essential 
for the survival of humanity that 
nuclear weapons are never used again, 
under any circumstances. The univer-
sal way to accomplish this is through 
the total elimination of such weapons” 
(Loeak 2014).
The RMI court cases criticized the 
United States and other nuclear pow-
ers for failing to enter into compre-
hensive disarmament negotiations, 
as required under the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty and customary 
international law. Initial hearings in 
the US Federal Court were conducted 
in September, with the judge later 
rejecting the RMI application; the icj 
case continues.
The release of previously classi-
fied cabinet papers detailing US and 
Australian policy toward nuclear-
free zones (Maclellan 2013) has 
renewed attention on strengthening 
the Rarotonga treaty for a South 
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. Despite 
US President Barack Obama’s call-
ing on the US Senate to ratify the 
Rarotonga treaty protocols in 2011, 
there has been no action by the US 
Congress. In the communiqué from 
their 2014 meeting in Palau, Forum 
leaders “encouraged the United States 
to ratify the Protocols to the South 
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty as 
soon as possible” (pifs 2014b, 4).
British, New Zealand, and Fijian 
military veterans continued to lobby 
for compensation from the United 
Kingdom (UK) government, following 
1950s nuclear testing in Australia and 
Kiribati (Maclellan 2015b). In January 
2015, Fiji Prime Minister Bainima-
rama announced that his government 
would compensate Fijian survivors 
of British nuclear tests on Christmas 
Island and Malden Island because of 
the ongoing refusal of the UK Ministry 
of Defense to address the health and 
environmental consequences of the 
tests in 1957–1958. 
Bainimarama—whose father had 
led the first contingent of Fijian sailors 
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to Christmas Island in 1957—con-
demned past nuclear testing and the 
contemporary reliance on extended 
nuclear deterrence: “Just as we 
implore the industrialized nations 
now to stand with us in the battle 
against rising sea levels caused by 
the carbon emissions they cause, 
not us, we also implore them to join 
us in our  commitment to make the 
Pacific nuclear free. . . . It is a form of 
madness that we in the Pacific—the 
ocean that takes its name from the 
word ‘peace’—find incomprehensible, 
which is why we will always be on 
the side of those nations pressing for 
the dismantling of the world’s nuclear 
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